RIGA (Reuters) - The United States said on Saturday it had a “robust” ability to deter North Korea in the face of worries that the reclusive state might be planning to test a nuclear weapon.

Saying that such a test would be provocative, the White House had tough rhetoric for Pyongyang hours after Asian and European foreign ministers meeting in Kyoto issued a statement of concern.

“We have a robust deterrent capability and no one should mistake what our capability is,” White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters during a visit by President Bush to Latvia.

I wish I’d been there in Latvia, because I think that I’m one of those people who might be mistaking what our “deterrent capability” is. Both practically and linguistically, it’s got me confused.

First off, if we do have the capability to deter, shouldn’t we just, er, go ahead and sort of… do that? You know, if we have the ability to deter North Korea from making more nuclear weapons and ways of deploying ‘em… why, that’d be swell. Let’s move our “deterrent capability” into action so that it becomes an “actual deterrent.” I’m for it.

Sadly, I think that McClellan wasn’t talking about stopping North Korea from making or even testing nuclear weapons. I think he was talking about deterring them from using ‘em. In other words, it’s the same ol’ deterrent that the ever-expanding family of nuclear nations have been using for the past 60 years: “Let’s not blow each other up, okay?”

That’s a decent deterrent too, top-notch, but I don’t think that North Korea or India or Pakistan or any of the other recent births in our frightening new nuclear family have any illusions about that. I’d guess that North Korea knows that the US has the ability to, um, vastly reduce real-estate prices in Pyongyang.

So I guess I’d have had two things to say to Scott McClellan in Latvia yesterday (once again, I’m really sorry I wasn’t there. Bit of a scheduling conflict…):

1) The 60 year-old threat of turning millions of civilians and their cities into sand, gravel, and a sticky residue isn’t a “deterrent capability.” It’s a full-fledged “deterrent.” Might as well stand up straight and own that one, boy.

2) When it comes to our “capability” to deter North Korea from making nukes… we don’t have that, really. Not so much.

Back in 2002, we had a deterrent of that nature. I’m sure it was all the talk of those Axis of Evil board meetings and golf holidays. “If we don’t develop nuclear weapons,” Saddam might have told Kim Jong Il while waiting for Mohammad Khatami to tee off at the par 4 fifteenth, “we won’t get invaded. Look out!”

The “Look out!” part was probably just said to ruin Khatami’s swing. They weren’t the Axis of Fair Play, after all. But Saddam’s point must have seemed valid back in ‘02. Let in a few inspectors, stop developing your WMD’s, and you can look forward to a bright future of terrorizing your people in peace and comfort for years to come.

That was ‘02. But now Kim Jong Il must realize that not developing nuclear weapons is one-way ticket to a spider hole, and he probably doubts his ability to grow one of those rakish Unabomber beards that came so easily to Saddam.

That, after all, is the message we sent to North Korea. Not just when we barnstormed into Iraq, but when we pointedly refused to say “Oops” when our intelligence proved to have been trumped-up and Saddam bizarrely innocent of possessing or developing WMDs. If we’d said “Oops,” Kim Jong Il might’ve thought he had a chance of slogging along indefinitely without interference if he’d only abandon his nuclear program. But the lack of an audible “Oops” and a conspicuous empty seat at the annual Axis of Evil Celebrity Poker Tournament last year probably convinced him otherwise.

That’s not a deterrent. That’s the opposite.